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With respect for the core business: the impact of party ideology on 
the odds of government participation among regionalist  parties
Lorenzo Terrière, Nicolas Bouteca1
Abstract:
An increasing number of regionalist parties have participated in regional or national 
 executive office. This article examines the specific conditions under which this party type in-
creases its odds of successful cabinet entry – with a focus on ideological party change. Their 
programmatic profile is mapped before and after government entry by applying quantita-
tive content analysis on coded electoral manifestos. The binary logistic regression analyses 
provide empirical evidence that regionalist parties that compromise on their territorial core 
business are more likely to enter (regional) government. Regionalist parties are also more 
likely to cross the threshold of (regional) governance when they operate in more decentral-
ized countries and when they are a larger electoral factor in the regional political arena. 
Other relevant control variables, such as economic growth, national electoral score and 
party age, do not generate a significant effect on the odds of government participation.  
Key words: regionalist parties; government participation; party ideology; quantitative 
 manifesto research; western multi-level democracies; comparative research
Introduction
Over the past few decades, regionalist parties have gradually gained electoral strength 
across Western multi-level democracies. Nowadays, they are often well represented at the 
regional and increasingly also at the national policy-making level (Müller-Rommel 1998: 
17). An increase in electoral vote share then creates opportunities for government entry. 
In several parliaments, regionalist parties are pivotal for a stable democratic majority (Ste-
furiuc 2009: 93) although, in contrast with ‘established’ and ‘state-wide’ party families, 
the regionalist party type questions the territorial integrity of the state as such (Elias and 
Tronconi 2011: 505). They put forward staunch demands for self-government and several 
disquieting high-impact cases are reported in the popular media. 
Secessionist upheaval in Catalonia, Scotland and Flanders challenges trusted mod-
els of political decision-making (Tronconi 2015: 579). Nonetheless, their radical strive for 
regional autonomy does not seem to prevent these parties from actively participating 
in regional and even national government constellations (Deschouwer 2008). But while 
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 regionalist parties primarily adhere to their own sub-territory within the State (Deschouwer 
2003: 213), political studies on parties and coalition governments have been dominated 
by a State-centric bias (Hepburn and Detterbeck 2013: 76); the so-called “methodological 
nationalism” (Schakel 2013: 212). In order to address this research gap, this study explicitly 
combines traditional areas of party research (e.g. party ideology, party change) with rather 
new research domains (e.g. multi-level governance).
Political parties that cross the threshold of governance manage to implement their 
ideas into reality and thereby deeply shape the daily lives of all citizens (Dandoy 2014: 629). 
Since the ideological fundamentals of regionalist parties challenge the constitutional status 
quo of the state, their potential impact on political outcomes is not to be underestimated. 
Hence, getting a better insight in the programmatic strategies that governing regionalist 
parties apply may advance our appraisal of the real influence that this party type has on 
our society.
In particular, parties that aspire to co-govern will need to adjust their own profile in 
order to successfully connect with potential coalition partners (Laver and Budge 1992). The 
prospect of government entry confronts parties with a difficult trade-off: on which issues 
and to what degree are they prepared to compromise in order to enter government? And is 
a party’s readiness to give in bigger at the regional than at the national policy-level?
A vast body of literature has researched coalition formation dilemmas from the 
viewpoint of ‘traditional’ and ‘established’ party types (e.g. Kluver and Sagarzazu 2015: 
333). Often described as ‘centrist’ parties, the latter are more likely to become governing 
partners, since they face smaller programmatic differences to overcome (Bawn and Topcu 
2012: 433). The opposite is true for ‘peripheral’ parties, which are typically located at the 
ends of the political spectrum (Alonso et. al. 2015: 851). The regionalist party type is an 
example of this category of peripheral parties. 
Consequently, it seems inevitable that radical parties that want to become more 
engaged in the political system will need to devote attention to mainstream issues and 
moderate their stances (Schumacher et. al., 2015: 1040). Indeed, manifestos of incumbent 
parties should be similar (Louwerse 2009: 17). Even beforehand, an “anticipation” effect 
is at play here: (regionalist) parties prepare for cabinet by timely adapting and giving in on 
various topics because they have to create ideological convergence with potential coalition 
partners and draft a collective government agreement on a variety of policy issues (Dandoy 
2014: 629). After entering government, we can speak of a “contagion” effect (Van Spanje 
2010: 563): (regionalist) parties need to loyally defend the whole government record and 
are held accountable for the policy outputs by the public (Dandoy 2014: 629). They com-
pete with their coalition partners by adopting each other’s policy positions (Van Spanje 
2010: 563). The literature has observed programmatic moderation from two dominant 
theoretical perspectives, i.e. by measuring salience (issue emphasis) and position (centrist 
or radical). Both theories are incorporated in this study to assess regionalist parties’ mani-
festos. Rather than looking at policy issues individually, these are grouped into broader 
ideological clusters that resemble the main dimensions of party competition. 
Binary logistic regression models are constructed to compute the probabilities (i.e. 
odds ratios) of successful government entry among regionalist parties. Here, party ide-
ology is regarded as the main independent variable and government entry as the main 
dependent variable. Various control variables, as they render relevant from the literature, 
are included into the model in order to identify net treatment effects. The results confirm 
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Regionalist parties are defined in this research as “parties that refer to geographically 
concentrated minorities which challenge the working order, even the democratic order, by 
demanding recognition of their cultural identity. Regionalist parties articulate discontent 
at the constitutional status quo of their ‘territory’, advocating anything from cultural au-
tonomy to national independence” (Müller-Rommel 1998: 17). Their primary concern is to 
reach a form of territorial self-governance (De Winter and Türsan 1998: 204). The program-
matic core business of regionalist parties is shaped by their decentralization claim. Massetti 
and Schakel (2016: 432) add a territorial characterization: regionalist parties are only pre-
sent, as organizations or in terms of electoral activity, in a specific territory of the state. In 
other words, regionalist parties are also ‘regional’ (i.e. non-statewide) or, more precisely, 
they are a sub-set of regional parties. And even though regionalist parties move their posi-
tions on the territorial axis in just one direction (Alonso 2012; Massetti and Schakel 2013: 
797), within this decentralization side they differ substantially, hereby ranging from radical 
to moderate opinions (De Winter and Türsan 1998), and from secessionist to autonomist 
standpoints (Mazzoleni 2009: 199). 
While many party families’ (evolving) ideology has been researched quantitatively 
and systematically across time and space (e.g. Bouteca and Devos, 2016: 298; Harmel and 
Janda, 1995), regionalist parties are still a blind spot here. Indeed, most of the literature on 
political parties in multilevel democracies focuses on the established, state-wide parties 
(Field and Hamann 2015: 900). Only recently, regionalist parties are regarded as a distinct 
party family (Swenden and Maddens 2009), let alone that their programmatic profile has 
been studied yet at an aggregated level.
Most academic research that deals with ideological party change is grounded in the 
literature of party competition. In this study, we draw on the prior works of Elias, Szocsik 
and Zuber (2015: 839) and Wagner and Meyer (2017: 84) in order to identify three main di-
mensions of party competition for further empirical analysis: a socio-economic (left-right), 
territorial (centralization-decentralization) and liberalism-authoritarianism (migration, 
security, fabric of society) axis. The second dimension is particularly relevant here since 
territorial demands constitute the ideological core business of our research object – i.e. the 
regionalist party type.
Creating convergence
These days, regionalist parties are often well represented in parliament (i.e. legislative 
branch), and an increasing number have also taken up responsibilities in government (i.e. 
executive branch). The prospect of government participation inevitably triggers a process 
of ideological convergence: parties aspiring to enter the executive branch have to mutually 
connect with potential coalition partners (Dandoy 2014: 629). This suggests a “prepara-
tion” or an “anticipation” phase during which regionalist parties adapt their programmatic 
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 profile in order to increase their odds of successful cabinet entry. While regionalist par-
ties are described as peripheral actors (Tronconi 2015: 579), their mainstream, state-wide 
competitors are usually located at the centre of the political spectrum (Fabre and Swenden 
2013: 342). But the latter will be reluctant to engage in negotiations with parties with whom 
there is insufficient common ground for a joint agreement. Consequently, those regionalist 
parties that gain access to executive office may only form a specific subset – e.g. the more 
moderate ones (Elias and Tronconi, 2011: 505) since those have a larger coalition potential 
(Schamp & Bouteca, 2018: 143). We test this through a first hypothesis: 
Regionalist parties that participate in government are ideologically different 
from regionalist parties that remain in opposition.
Programmatic party change can be observed from two important conceptual perspectives. 
From a salience point of view, creating ideological convergence means increasing the em-
phasis on those topics that the mainstream parties primarily adhere to, while downplaying 
those issues that belong to the regionalist parties’ own core business (Budge and Farlie 
1983; Greene 2016: 809). Very similar to the political life cycle of green parties (Adams et. 
al. 2006: 513), regionalist parties operate as policy entrepreneurs in the political arena. 
They originated as niche players and single-issue parties, but over time they went through 
a process of issue-diversification (Adams and Ezrow 2012: 1272). Hepburn (2009: 477) uses 
the metaphor ‘from niche to normal’ to describe this longitudinal development that many 
non-statewide parties, inter alia regionalist parties, went through. This programmatic tran-
sition is accompanied by a change in electoral strategy (Adams et. al. 2006: 513): whereas 
niche parties typically respond to their core voters (i.e. stressing territorial demands), main-
stream parties respond to the median voter (i.e. dealing with a broad range of other issues). 
Consequently, peripheral actors who become more involved in the political system 
need to “anticipate” future office prospects and go through such a transition. In addition, 
once regionalist parties are in the cabinet, they need to defend the collective government 
record as they are held accountable for all the policy outputs by the public. In line with the 
existing “contagion theory”, we therefore also acknowledge that parties seeking to com-
pete with their opponents will in turn have to look like them (Van Spanje 2010: 563) – this 
especially true among coalition parties. In other words, throughout the legislature region-
alist parties’ scope of attention also gets “contaminated” by the various issues that their 
coalition partners also mark as a policy priority. We conclude that it is this interplay of 
“anticipation” and “contagion” effects that will cause significant adaptations in the issue 
salience of governing regionalist parties. 
The territorial dimension is only a marginal phenomenon in Western politics. Previ-
ous scholars estimate its overall salience in electoral manifestos at 2-3%, and up to 5% in 
multi-level democracies where regionalist parties compete (Libbrecht, Maddens & Swenden 
2013). The decentralization side of this dimension challenges the constitutional status quo 
of the state; a debate that traditional, state-wide parties typically want to avoid (Toubeau 
and Wagner 2016: 340). Instead, the latter parties focus on the two other dimensions – i.e. 
socio-economic and liberalism-authoritarianism. Hence, regionalist parties that aspire to 
govern are expected to downplay their core business and to put more emphasis on their 
secondary issues. We test the presence of both salience strategies through the following 
hypotheses:
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Hypothesis two: Regionalist parties devote less attention to territorial issues 
once they cross the threshold of governance.
Hypothesis three: Regionalist parties devote more attention to socio-economic 
and liberal-authoritarian issues once they cross the threshold of governance.
Programmatic party change can also be observed from a positional perspective. We ac-
knowledge that both the anticipation and contagion effect are at play here. For peripheral 
actors just as for the regionalist party type, becoming an acceptable government coalition 
partner generally means moving away from radical opinions towards more centrist stand-
points on the different ideological dimensions of party competition (Elias and Tronconi 
2011: 505). Ideally, this takes place during an “anticipation” phase beforehand in order 
to increase the odds of successful cabinet entry. Moderation of policy stances has been 
repeatedly demonstrated among established, state-wide parties in government (Bawn and 
Topcu 2012:433; Schumacher et. al. 2015: 1040), and there is partial empirical evidence 
that the logic of this argument also applies to the regionalist party type (Field and Hamann 
2015: 900; Hepburn and Detterbeck 2013: 76). Next, parties are also likely to become more 
centrist after a spell in executive office (Schumacher et. al. 2015: 1040), which then points 
to a “contagion” effect.
We expect such a programmatic moderation to take place on the three ideologi-
cal dimensions. As regionalist parties are clearly all located at the decentralization side of 
the territorial dimension (cf. supra), a centrist move would be most visible here. Such a 
transition is highly probable since sticking to tough territorial demands is difficult to rec-
oncile with being a stable and credible partner in government. Furthermore, ideological 
moderation on socio-economic and liberal-authoritarian issues would be much appreciated 
by potential (mainstream, state-wide) coalition partners because they generally consider 
these issues as pivotal. Regionalist parties regard these dimensions as of secondary impor-
tance, which in turn allows them to be more flexible here. We test the presence of both 
positional strategies through the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis four: Regionalist parties moderate their positions on the territorial 
issues they address once they enter into government.
Hypothesis five: Regionalist parties moderate their positions on the socio-
economic and liberal-authoritarian issues they address once they enter into 
government.
Context matters
Various other party- and country-related variables may exert an influence on the odds of 
successful cabinet entry among regionalist parties. At least four are included in our research 
model as control variables. To begin with, the specific institutional architecture of the coun-
try – i.e. the degree of decentralization – may temper or intensify the empirical relationship 
between ideological party change and government incumbency among regionalist parties. 
For example, state-wide parties have often “accommodated” territorial demands to put a 
brake on regionalist parties’ electoral growth (Swenden and Maddens 2009). In that way, 
the mere existence of regionalist parties as full-fledged political actors in the electoral are-
na already presupposes their partial success; i.e. their achievement to have brought about 
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decentralization reforms and the establishment of regional electoral arenas (Massetti and 
Schakel 2016: 432). Decentralized countries then provide more opportunities for political 
entrepreneurs to establish new regionalist parties that successfully cross the threshold of 
governance [1]. 
Party size is a second, affiliated control variable: larger parties are more likely to 
be involved in the negotiation talks (Ceron 2016: 797). Regionalist parties that obtain a 
larger electoral score are more likely to enter into government [2]. Party age [3] and eco-
nomic climate [4] may also play a role here. Indeed, while a young party will stick to its 
guns and keep a narrow ideological focus, it tends to broaden its scope of attention as the 
party grows older and becomes more actively involved in the political system (Wagner and 
Meyer 2013: 1246). This will then increase its odds of government participation. Finally, 
economic conditions have also shown to predict a party’s profile and its incumbency status; 
e.g. Greene (2016: 809).
Data and Methodology
The universe of regionalist parties is gradually expanding as they have gained electoral 
strength across Western multi-level democracies over recent decades (Müller-Rommel 
1998: 17). Massetti and Schakel (2016) publicized a comprehensive list of 227 regionalist 
parties across 16 countries throughout the post-World War II period. Their overview is used 
as a starting point for the case-selection in this study.    
Government participation is the main dependent variable in this comparative 
research. It is operationalized as a binary variable (value “1” or “0”) per year and per policy-
level: either “in” or “out” of government. For both the regional and national policy-making 
level, this variable was mapped for the whole life cycle of the regionalist parties included 
in this study (cf. infra). Drafting this comprehensive overview required extensive historical 
in-depth research. Up until now, only fragmented overviews of this matter existed. They are 
now brought together and completed in one summarized table (cf. Appendix A). 
However, since a dichotomous variable does not leave much room for nuance, many 
situations in which regionalist parties operated in a grey zone are given a “0”- value. For 
example, several Spanish regionalist parties, such as Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
(ERC) and Coalición Canaria (CC), or the Canadian Bloc Québecois, have provided vital par-
liamentary support to the national government, although these moments are not coded 
here as “1”. Only when a party was a full-fledged formal coalition partner and constituted 
an integral part of the government the case is given a “1”- value. 
On the other hand, this sharp distinction makes group membership (i.e. participa-
tion in government: yes or no) mutually exclusive so that it can be clearly assessed how this 
dependent variable relates to a set of independent predictors (i.e. party ideology and other 
control variables). This approach will allow us to determine the probability of an outcome 
(i.e. government participation among regionalist parties) based on a set of given inputs 
(e.g. programmatic change and/or inertia).
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Coded electoral platforms
The hypotheses (cf. supra) requires shedding light on both the “salience” and “position” 
side of the medallion. Regionalist parties’ varying programmatic profiles are investigated 
here by conducting a large N-analysis. A well-known method to map such programmatic 
party change is through analysing electoral platforms (Budge et. al. 2001). These official 
party documents are widely acknowledged as a reliable and well-established tool to es-
timate party ideology (Pogorelis 2005: 992). Therefore, we opt to conduct quantitative 
content analysis on regionalist parties’ manifestos. 
The long-standing Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR) and 
the more recent Regional Manifestos Project (RMP) provide two readily available data-
sets of coded party programmes. MARPOR inventories national programmes whilst RMP 
solely includes regional ones. Both projects apply the same logic, methodology and cod-
ing scheme. From Massetti and Schakel’ s list, 48 regionalist parties appear in either the 
MARPOR and/or the RMP dataset, accounting for respectively 167 and 129 coded electoral 
manifestos that are suitable for further statistical analysis (cf. Appendix A and B). 
RMP is still a fairly recent project and currently limited to three investigated coun-
tries (Italy, Spain, Great Britain). Yet, it includes an important subset of regionalist parties 
that are also present in the MARPOR dataset. Therefore, the MARPOR data is used to test 
the hypotheses at hand and the RMP data is used to check whether the national figures can 
be underpinned with regional data.
The main independent variable, i.e. party ideology, is operationalized in this study by 
constructing three ideological clusters (socio-economic, territorial and liberalism-authori-
tarianism) out of the detailed MARPOR/RMP coding scheme. Each cluster represents one 
dimension of party competition: they are actually regroupings of codes into broader issue 
categories (cf. Appendix C). We apply the same ‘socio-economic’ (20 issues) and ‘liberalism-
authoritarianism’ (16 issues) clusters that Bakker and Hobolt (2013) already constructed for 
their programmatic research. Earlier factor analyses proved that these issues tend to fre-
quently appear together in party platforms (Cole, 2005: 203). We add a ‘territorial’ cluster 
to the analysis which is comprised of (merely) two relevant issues from the coding scheme. 
Yet, these codes capture the institutional and decentralization aspects of politics. As such, 
the territorial cluster represents the ideological core business of the research object at 
hand – i.e. regionalist parties.
In the MARPOR- and RMP- dataset, each code actually represents percentages of 
the party programme devoted to a certain issue. The three ideological clusters do not in-
clude all the available codes from the scheme but there surely is a ceiling in what parties 
can discuss: an increased emphasis on topic A tends to decrease attention for topic B and/
or C. Thus, the three values of salience for each party are to some extent correlated as a 
result of how they are computed. 
For position scores there is no such limit. While salience scores are the sum of the 
relative frequencies, position scores are computed by splitting the issues within each clus-
ter into bipolar categories. The method of measurement is well-established in manifesto 
research and was developed by the founders of the MARPOR-project themselves (Budge 
et. al. 2001). This approach was repeatedly applied by other authors to conduct similar 
research (e.g. Fagerholm 2016: 304; Van der Brug 2004: 209). The results this method has 
produced are proven to be solid and successful (Mikhaylov et. al. 2012: 78). 
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Within each cluster the total weight of both poles is re-balanced so that both sides count 
equal. For socio-economic positioning, the standard right-left ‘RILE’ scale is applied as it 
was developed by the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et. al. 2001; Mikhaylov et. 
al. 2012: 78). Positions are measured on a -100/+100 scale, however, nearly all the cases 
fall within the -50/+50 scale, which makes it actually a more accurate point of reference. 
Territorial position equals to decentralization salience minus centralization salience; RILE 
position is right emphasis minus left emphasis (so: ‘-‘ is left whereas ‘+’ is right); liberal-
ism-authoritarianism position is liberal frequency minus authoritarian frequency (so: ‘–‘ is 
authoritarian-orientated whereas ‘+’ is liberal-minded).
As a net result the main independent variable, i.e. party ideology, is operationalized 
here by six ratio scale variables. The three salience scores are expressed in percentages 
while the three position scores are expressed in figures preceded by minus or plus. The six 
values are computed for every respective coded electoral manifesto in the MARPOR- and 
RMP- dataset.
Calculating rates of success
The relationship between the main dependent and independent variable displays a non-lin-
ear pattern. By performing a binary logistic regression both (a) the data can be transformed 
into a more linear relationship by calculating log-odds. 
Various contextual factors may influence the relationship. Therefore, included in the 
regression model is a set of relevant control variables, as they render relevant from the 
literature (cf. supra). First, electoral strength is operationalized in terms of obtained (a) 
national and (b) regional electoral scores. The percentages were collected from official gov-
ernment websites. Second, the degree of institutional decentralization is made tangible by 
using the Regional Authority Index (Hooghe et. al., 2016). Third, national economic growth 
is taken into account by invoking the OECD database (percentages of GDP). Fourth, party 
age is included by calculating the number of years since a party’s foundation.
Results
Descriptives
Merging the MARPOR data on electoral manifestos with the collected historical data on 
government participation produces some interesting descriptive statistics about the main 
dependent variable. For example: Regionalist parties only exceptionally entered federal 
governments. Only 7.2% (12/167) of their national party programs were presented when 
the party was in national government while nearly half (42.5%: 71/167) were publicized 
in years when the regionalist party took part in regional government. Actually, only in Bel-
gium (VU/N-VA, FDF/Défi, RW) and in Italy (LN) have regionalist parties been in this latter 
scenario. Remarkably, there is one regionalist party in the dataset (the Walloon RW) that 
did participate in the national government but never took part in the regional government. 
Regionalist parties’ median electoral score is obviously much lower at the national 
level (1.63%) than at the regional level (20.51%) while their median party age in the data-
set is 17 years. The Spanish Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) holds the maximum of (nine) 
consecutive inventoried manifestos during regional government participation, while the 
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Italian Lega Nord (LN) accounts for a maximum of (four) successive coded platforms during 
national government participation. One fifth (21%: 35/167) of the manifestos belong to (14) 
regionalist parties that never governed in the years that their coded party platforms were 
included into the MARPOR- dataset. Actually, seven of those regionalist parties (e.g. Flem-
ish Interest in Belgium) effectively never gained access to the executive branch. The other 
seven parties (e.g. the British Plaid Cymru and the Spanish Chunta Aragonista) did take up 
(regional) government responsibility, however not in years that their coded party platforms 
are included in the dataset. 
Do those regionalist parties that make it into government vastly differ from those 
which solely remain in opposition (H1)? If this were the case, it would actually pose an en-
dogeneity problem with regard to our research object. When looking at the mean values 
for the variables on party ideology (cf. Table 1), we see no statistically significant distinction 
between both subsets. While there are only minor differences in issue emphasis, governing 
regionalist parties also do not consistently hold more moderate positions than oppositional 
ones. This means the first hypothesis is rejected. Among the control variables, two of them 
do generate a significant difference: governing regionalist parties are clearly larger parties 
(25.38% vs. 14.3%) at the regional level and they are also way older (30.87 years vs. 15.31 
years) than their oppositional counterparts.
Table 1: Descriptive (MARPOR) statistics : Governing vs. Oppositional Regionalist Parties (with N=167)
(Independent) Variable Governing Oppositional
Territorial salience (%) 12,86% 10,06%
Social-economic salience (%) 26,26% 29,86%
Liberalism-Authoritarianism salience (%) 30,01% 34,69%
Territorial position (- or +) (+)12,81 (+)10
Right-Left position (- or +) -8,46 -10,65
Liberalism-Authoritarianism position (- or +) (+)14.9 (+)5.5
Electoral score - regional (% votes) 25,38% 14,30%
Electoral score - national (% votes) 3,25% 3,83%
Economic Growth (% GDP) 2,27% 2,13%
Party age (years since foundation) 30,87 15,31
Regional Authority Index score 26,39 29,33
Source: Author based on his own calculations.
Regression analysis
Nevertheless, for the subsequent analysis the subset of oppositional regionalist parties is fil-
tered out of the investigated data. This is in order to determine the pure and net treatment 
effect of ideological party change (or: persistence) on the odds of successful government 
entry exclusively among the subset of governing regionalist parties. The remaining 132 
electoral manifestos are split between 61 cases out of (“0”) government and 71 in (“1”) 
government. Unfortunately, the number of coded manifestos publicized during national 
government participation alone is too low for a statistical regression analysis; yet for iso-
lated regional government participation it is sufficiently high. 
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Table 2: Binary Logistic Regression: regional government participation (salience). With N=132
(Independent) Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Block 1
Territorial salience (%) -0,163 0,087 3,548 1 0,06 0,849
Liberalism-Authoritarianism salience (%) 0,006 0,084 0,005 1 0,944 1,006
Social-Economic salience (%) 0,091 0,09 1,027 1 0,311 1,095
Block 2
Electoral score - national (% votes) 0,322 0,176 3,349 1 0,067 1,38
Electoral score - regional (% votes) 0,061 0,04 2,338 1 0,126 1,063
Regional Authority Index score 0,209 0,091 5,251 1 0,022 1,232
Economic Growth (% GDP) -0,128 0,209 0,373 1 0,541 0,88
Party age (years since foundation) 0,025 0,016 2,452 1 0,117 1,025
Constant -7,831 5,812 1,816 1 0,178 0
Source: Author based on his own calculations.
In this regression analysis (cf. Table 2), “Block 1” consists of the main independent variables 
(i.e. party ideology) while “Block 2” includes the control variables. From a salience point 
of view (Hypotheses 2 and 3), the basic model generates a negative effect of territorial 
salience on government participation (beta coefficient=-0.163, p=0.06). This effect grows 
stronger when the control variables from Block 2 are added (Sig. two-tailed decreases from 
p=0.095 to p=0.06). In other words, regionalist parties that decrease their emphasis on 
territorial topics increase their opportunities to effectively enter (regional) government, 
whereby this relationship intensifies when we control for the five variables in Block 2. Thus, 
the second hypothesis is accepted. 
Simultaneously, the socio-economic effect is positive and the relationship improves 
(Sig. two-tailed lowers from p=0.43 to p=0.31) while the liberalism-authoritarianism rela-
tionship shows no clear direction and weakens (Sig. two-tailed increases from p=0.37 to 
p=0.94). This means that the evaluation of the third hypothesis is nuanced: more attention 
for socio-economic topics increases the odds of government participation while liberalism-
authoritarianism issue salience doesn’t generate any impact. At this stage, none of the main 
independent variables generates a significant relationship (whereby p<0.05). But this is not 
a necessity here: the laws of statistical inference do not strictly apply as the investigated 
sample approximates the whole population – i.e. all regionalist parties that ever partici-
pated in government. 
The correct interpretation of Table 2 requires some additional explanation. The 
initial data displayed a non-linear relationship (cf. supra). Table 2 then displays log odds: 
the data are transformed so that probabilities can be calculated as if it were a linear rela-
tionship. In a logistic regression the B-values are the regression coefficients. These are the 
predicted changes in odds (plus or minus) to fall within one of the two groups (“in” or “out” 
of regional government) for every unit of change in the respective independent variable. 
Alternatively, the Exp(B)- values are odds ratios which vary between >1 or <1: they indicate 
whether the respective independent variable increases or decreases when the dependent 
variable goes up one level. Exp(B) is similar to B: when B is positive, then Exp(B) is >1. Stand-
ard Errors, Wald z values and Degrees of Freedom are also displayed in Table 2.
The classification rate of this model, i.e. the ratio of correct predictions whether a 
party is expected to be “out” (0) of or “in” (1) regional government based on the included 
independent variables, raises from 72% (Block 1) to 87% when Block 2 is added. In the 
case of random guesswork, the successful prediction rate would be 50%. Furthermore, the 
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Nagelkerke R square increases from 18% (Block 1) to 49% when Block 2 is included. Finally, 
the Hosmer and Lemeshow test is applied to calculate the Chi square value (=7.4), while the 
p-value here is >0.05 (which in this case is actually an indicator of good model fit). 
The current model fit can be enhanced by removing those excessive independent 
variables that clearly didn’t generate a significant effect in the first place. Consequently, if 
the “liberalism-authoritarianism” and “socio-economic” salience variables are omitted, the 
model fit improves (R²= 0.47; Chi² = 4.9; Df=8; Class. Rate = 82%). The detected negative 
effect of territorial salience now becomes highly significant (Sig. two-tailed decreases from 
p=0.06 to p=0.008). Including the five control variables (Block 2) makes the effect between 
territorial salience and government participation stronger and more robust. In other words, 
regionalist parties that decrease their emphasis on territorial topics in their electoral mani-
festos increase their probabilities to enter regional government (B=-0.194; p=0.008). This is 
another solid confirmation of the second hypothesis: it proves that regionalist parties that 
aspire to govern compromise on their (primary) ideological dimension in order to connect 
with potential coalition partners. 
The latter parties are generally mainstream, state-wide competitors which primarily 
focus on the two other ideological dimensions of party competition. Here, we see that an 
increase in socio-economic salience among regionalist parties results in higher odds of gover-
nment participation (B=0.091). This is in line with the third hypothesis. Yet, regionalist parties 
do not alter their attention for liberalism-authoritarianism topics to improve their prospects 
of successful cabinet entry. A possible explanation for this can be found in the literature on 
“sub state nationalism” (Freeden 1998) and “identity politics” (Smith 1996). These authors 
have highlighted that the territorial and liberalism-authoritarianism issue dimensions are 
highly intertwined in the case of stateless regionalist and nationalist parties (“SRNPs”). When 
regionalist parties have to give in on their territorial core business, their associated cultural-
-identity demands are under pressure as well. Consequently, the lack of an effect on this 
latter dimension may be due to simultaneous dynamics of increasing and decreasing salience 
which neutralize each other in the end. In sum, the evaluation of the third hypothesis is nuan-
ced (increase in socio-economic salience, no change in liberalism-authoritarianism salience). 
In addition, two control variables (i.e. national electoral score and RAI score) also 
show a significant effect in relation with the main dependent variable (whereby p<0.05). 
This means that regionalist parties that have a higher electoral score at the national level 
are more likely to enter into regional government (B=0.341; p=0.048). And if a regionalist 
party operates in a more decentralized country it will enjoy more opportunities to partici-
pate in regional government (B=0.167; p=0.036). The results are reported in Table 3.
Table 3: Binary Logistic Regression: regional government participation (salience). With N=132
(Independent) Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Block 1 Territorial salience (%) -0,194 0,073 7,132 1 0,008 0,823
Block 2
Electoral score - national (% votes) 0,341 0,173 3,911 1 0,048 1,407
Electoral score - regional (% votes) 0,061 0,038 2,567 1 0,109 1,063
Regional Authority Index score 0,167 0,079 4,42 1 0,036 1,181
Economic Growth (% GDP) -0,118 0,201 0,345 1 0,557 0,889
Party age (years since foundation) 0,024 0,015 2,617 1 0,106 1,024
Constant -3,689 2,283 2,611 1 0,106 0,025
Source: Author based on his own calculations.
2020 | Vol. 12 | No. 3 
86
The same regression analysis is now also performed for the positional perspective (cf. Ta-
ble 4) in order to address the fourth and fifth hypothesis. Analogously, only the governing 
regionalist parties are examined (N=132) in order to identify the net treatment effect of ide-
ological party change (or: persistence) on the odds of (regional) government participation. 
Here, the binary logistic regression analysis generates its best model fit when in Block 1 “lib-
eralism-authoritarianism position” is omitted (R²=0.515; Chi²=5,5; Df=8; Class. Rate=83%). 
The basic model generates a positive effect of socio-economic (“RILE”) moderation on 
government participation (B=0.128). In other words, regionalist parties that develop a less 
leftist (=a more centrist) party stance increase their odds of cabinet entry. Including the 
five control variables (Block 2) weakens its statistical significance (Sig. two-tailed increases 
from p=0.012 to p=0.126) but this does not harm the observed empirical relationship as 
such. Recall that the laws of statistical inference do not strictly apply here as the investi-
gated sample approximates the whole population (cf. supra). Thus, the evaluation of the 
fifth hypothesis paints a nuanced picture: socio-economic moderation increases the odds 
of government participation while positional change in liberalism-authoritarianism topics 
doesn’t generate any impact.
On the other hand, there is negative and statistically significant territorial effect 
on cabinet entry: regionalist parties that put forward a less decentralist discourse signifi-
cantly increase their odds of regional government participation (B=-0.165; p=0.02). This 
confirms the fourth hypothesis. Including the five control variables (Block 2) in the model 
even further strengthens this negative territorial relationship (Sig. two-tailed decreases 
from p=0.048 to p=0.02).  
In addition, with regard to the control variables, in more decentralized countries it is 
significantly more probable for regionalist parties to enter regional government (B=0.167; 
p=0.036). Furthermore, older regionalist parties are more likely to participate in regional 
government (B=0.025; p=0.113). The results are reported in Table 4.
Table 4: Binary Logistic Regression: regional government participation (position). With N=132
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Block 1
Territorial position (- or +) -0,165 0,071 5,42 1 0,02 0,848
Right-Left position (- or +) 0,128 0,084 2,343 1 0,126 1,136
Block 2
Electoral score - national (% votes) 0,044 0,235 0,036 1 0,85 1,045
Electoral score - regional (% votes) 0,036 0,038 0,906 1 0,341 1,037
Regional Authority Index score 0,167 0,08 4,321 1 0,038 1,182
Economic Growth (% GDP) -0,088 0,205 0,184 1 0,668 0,916
Party age (years since foundation) 0,025 0,016 2,512 1 0,113 1,026
Constant -1,986 2,515 0,623 1 0,43 0,137
Source: Author based on his own calculations.
Supporting regional data
Thanks to the fairly recent Regional Manifesto Project, we can now check whether the na-
tional figures can be underpinned with regional findings by conducting the same analysis 
on the RMP- data. From the relevant regional electoral platforms (cf. supra), again half of 
them (52.7%: 68/129) were publicized in years when the respective regionalist party was 
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part of the regional government, while only two (1.6%) were presented when the party was 
in the national government. Both manifestos actually belong to the same Italian party LN 
(cf. Appendix B).  
Analogously, government participation is operationalized as a binary variable again, 
which does not leave much room for nuance. For example, several Spanish regionalist par-
ties provided coalition support to the central government in the past, although without 
appointing their own national ministers. Instead, CC managed to divert important financial 
resources from Madrid to the relatively poor archipelago of the Canary Islands. Partido Na-
cionalista Vasco (PNV), Convergència i Unió (CiU) and ERC managed to decentralize former 
national policy domains to the autonomous regions of Catalonia (e.g. university education) 
and Basque Country (e.g. fiscal autonomy). In order words, regionalist parties often opted 
to trade national parliamentary support for financial or institutional benefits for their own 
region. These cases are not coded as “1” but as “0” in the dataset, however. 
Three quarters of the (74.4%: 96/129) regional manifestos belong to regionalist par-
ties that ever participated in a regional and/or national government. Again, only these party 
platforms are used for the regression analysis. 
The descriptive statistics from the RMP data between the two subsets (i.e. governing 
versus oppositional regionalist parties) display a very similar pattern as to what the MAR-
POR data already taught us (cf. Appendix D). Again, the first hypothesis is rejected since no 
significant differences between both subgroups are detected with regard to the six variables 
on party ideology. Only two differences are worth mentioning here. First, the average ter-
ritorial salience among regionalist parties is much lower in the RMP- dataset. Probably this 
is due to a natural division of competences between the central and peripheral level across 
Western multi-level democracies. Most institutional affairs require constitutional change, 
which is by definition located at the national policy-level and increases the attention thereof 
in national party programmes. Second, on average regionalist parties hold more centrist 
positions in the RMP- dataset. This may be due to the fact that, within their own region, re-
gionalist parties find themselves more at the heart of the political spectrum. Here they are 
a larger political actor and they are more likely to form an integral part of the government.
Binary logistic regression analysis is repeated for the subset of governing regionalist 
parties (N=96) in order to determine the net treatment effect of ideological change on the 
odds of government participation. Again, the number of coded electoral manifestos pub-
licized during national government participation is too low for regression analysis, yet for 
isolated regional government participation it is sufficiently high. 
Analogously, the basic model consists of the main independent variables (Block 1) 
while Block 2 includes the control variables (cf. Appendix E). Once more, from a salience 
point of view a negative territorial effect is found. However while not significant, it does con-
firm the second hypothesis once more (B=-0.13; p=0,348). No clear effect was found for the 
two other main independent variables in Block 1, i.e. “liberalism-authoritarianism” and “so-
cio-economic” emphasis. This means that the third hypothesis is rejected here. Therefore, 
one could argue that regionalist parties are apparently less flexible in changing their regional 
manifestos than their national ones. Possibly, this is because they are a larger political actor 
at the regional level of government, which puts them in a stronger bargaining position. 
Regarding the control variables, the regional findings are very similar to the 
national ones (cf. supra). Again, both regional electoral score and RAI score generate a sig-
nificant effect. In other words, (1) in decentralized countries regionalist parties enjoy more 
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 opportunities to enter regional government (B=0.13; p=0.02) and (2) a greater regional elec-
toral score results into higher odds of regional government participation (B=0.05; p=0.10). 
Finally, the regression analysis is also performed for the positional perspective (cf. 
Appendix E). A negative territorial relationship is found, although not significant (B=-0.061; 
p=0.419), which is yet another confirmation of the fourth hypothesis. For the fifth hypoth-
esis the evaluation is nuanced again, but now the effect runs in the opposite direction: 
while socio-economic positioning doesn’t generate any impact, taking up a more centrist 
stance on “liberalism-authoritarianism” issues has a positive effect on the odds of regional 
government entry (B=-0,072; p=0.067). It confirms our general impression that regionalist 
parties are highly flexible on their secondary ideological dimensions. 
The control variables “RAI score” and “regional electoral score” once more show 
a significant effect. Regionalist parties in more decentralized countries are more likely to 
enter regional government (B=0.177; p=0.007). Likewise, regionalist parties that obtain a 
higher share of the regional vote significantly increase their opportunities for regional gov-
ernment participation (B=0.065; p=0.023).
Conclusions
This paper has investigated how regionalist parties can increase their odds of government 
participation through adaptation of their programmatic profile. Their coded electoral plat-
forms were analysed from a salience and a positional point of view. Movements on three 
important ideological dimensions of party competition were mapped; i.e. socio-economic, 
liberalism-authoritarian and territorial issues – whereby the latter category forms the core 
business of the regionalist party type. 
Binary logistic regression analyses performed on available MARPOR and RMP data 
generated a significant and robust negative territorial effect: regionalist parties that de-
crease their emphasis on territorial topics and/or take up a less decentralist stance in their 
electoral platforms increase their probabilities to enter (regional) government. For their 
two secondary ideological dimensions the empirical relationship with government partici-
pation is nuanced. Concerning socio-economic issues, regionalist parties that increase their 
salience or adopt more centrist (left-right) positions tend to increase their chances of (re-
gional) government entry. For liberalism-authoritarianism topics, however, we observe no 
change in issue salience and only a slight positional moderation once they cross the thresh-
old of government.
Various control variables were included into the regression analyses. While econom-
ic growth, party age and national electoral score only display a weak impact on the odds of 
government participation, the RAI score and regional vote share generate a significant re-
lationship. In other words, regionalist parties enjoy more opportunities to effectively enter 
(regional) government when they operate in more decentralized countries and when they 
are a larger political actor at the regional level. 
This quantitative research has shown us how regionalist parties ideologically adapt 
once they cross the threshold of government. More specifically, they compromise on their 
own territorial core business. We acknowledge that there is an anticipation effect (before) 
as well as a contagion effect (during).
Yet, while there are numerous cases of governing regionalist parties available at 
the peripheral policy-level, there are only few examples at the central policy-level. This is 
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an important limitation of this quantitative research: a more qualitative approach is better 
suited here to investigate party dynamics at the latter level more in-depth. Is there really a 
low appetite among regionalist parties to co-govern at the national level? Are they simply 
preoccupied with holding executive power in their own region? Or is the low number of 
available cases rather due to the limited opportunities provided to them by their state-wide 
political opponents? 
Complimentary qualitative research could unravel more in specific what the main 
incentives are that drive regionalist parties to cross the threshold of governance. What 
triggers regionalist parties to modify their programmatic profile over time? Most likely, re-
gionalist parties are confronted with the same strategic trade-off between policies, office 
and votes as all other party types. 
This study was a first systematic attempt to lay out a couple of general program-
matic trends among regionalist parties in cabinet. Consequently, an important limitation 
of this study is that it makes abstraction of country-specific circumstances. In that respect, 
it is important to highlight the relatively high number of Spanish cases in this dataset. Al-
though their inclusion does not alter the nature of the overall findings, country-specific 
analyses could verify whether the identified general trends do effectively uphold in dif-
ferent contexts. Furthermore, some policy domains are typically located at the peripheral 
(e.g. culture) or at the central (e.g. defence) level of government. For example, if territorial 
issues are by definition more frequently situated at the national level this has to be taken 
into account when interpreting the results above. Therefore, a more fine-grained analysis 
per policy domain could bring nuance to these initial and general findings.
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APPENDIXES:
Appendix A: Regionalist parties from the marpor dataset










VU Volksunie BEL 14 + 1 in cartel with ID21 
1981-1985 and 1988-1995 




FDF Front Democratique Francophone BEL
10 + 2 in cartel 
with PRL






Wallon - Walloon 
Rally
BEL 6 Only in opposition 1974-1977
N-VA
Nieuw Vlaamse 
Alliantie - New 
Flemish Alliance 
BEL 3 2004-2019 (Flanders) 2014-2019
VB Vlaams Belang - Flemish Interest BEL 10 Only in opposition
Only in 
Opposition 
BQ Bloc Quebecois CAN 8 Only active in general elections
Only in 
Opposition 
LDT Ticino League CH 1 1995-2019 (Ticino) Only in Opposition 
MCG Geneva Citizens‘ Movement CH 1 2013-2019 (Geneva)
Only in 
Opposition 
EE Basque Left - Euskadiko Ezkerra ESP 5






Regionalist Party - 
Partido Aragonés





Party - Partido 
Nacionalista Vasco
ESP 13
1978-2009 and 2012-2019 




EA Basque Solidarity - Eusko Alkartasuna ESP 6
1991 and 1995-2009 




PA Andalusian Party - Partido Andalucista ESP 6






Council - Chunta 
Aragonesista
ESP 2 2015-2019 (Aragon) Only in Opposition 
UPN
Navarrese People‘s 
Union - Unión del 
Pueblo Navarro
ESP 2 1991-2015 (Navarra) Only in Opposition 
GBAI
Gerao Bai - Future 
Yes  (= PNV+ in 
Region of Navarre)
ESP 1 2015-2019 (Navarra) Only in Opposition 
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Bloc - Bloque 
Nacionalista Galego
ESP 5 1987-1990 and 2005-2009 (Galicia)
Only in 
Opposition 
ECP En Común Podem (in Catalunia) ESP 2








En Marea = ANOVA 
+ Podemos + EU 
(Galicia) 







2016 : „A La 
Valencianna“)
ESP 2 2015-2019 (Valencia) Only in Opposition 





and Union - 
Convergència i Unió 
(=CDC+UDC)








ESP 1 1980-2003 and 2010-2017 Only in Opposition 
ERC
Catalan Republican 
Left - Esquerra 
Republicana de 
Catalunya











- Democràcia i 
Libertat (=CDC+ in 
2015)
ESP 1 1980-2003 and 2010-2017 Only in Opposition 
BP Bavarian party GER 1 1954-1957 Only in Opposition 




With respect for the core business
























Valley) - Autonomie 
Liberté Démocratie





Union in national 
elections)
ITA 1 1949-1966 and 1974-1990 and 1992-2019
Only in 
Opposition 
PC Plaid Cymru UK 1 2007-2011 Only in Opposition 
SNP Scottish National Party UK 4 2007-2019
Only in 
Opposition 
SF Sinn Fein - We Ourselves UK (NIRE) 3 1998-2003 and 2007-2017 Abstention
SDLP Social Democratic and Labour Party UK 1 1998-2002 and 2007-2019
Only in 
Opposition 
TOTALS 168   
Appendix B: Regionalist parties from the RMP dataset









PA Partido Andalucista ESP 2+1
Only in opposition 





ESP 5 1987-1993 and 1995-2015 (Aragon) Only in Opposition 





ESP 1 Only in opposition (Canarias) Only in Opposition 
CC Coalición Canaria ESP 4 1993-2019 Only in Opposition 
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2011 and 2015-2019 
(Cantabria)
Only in Opposition 
UPL Unión del Pueblo Leonés ESP 2 Only in Opposition Only in Opposition 
CIU Convergéncia i Unió ESP 6
1980-2003 and 2010-





ESP 5 1984-1987 and 2003-2010 and 2016-2019 Only in Opposition 
CUP Candidatura d‘Unitat Popular ESP 2 2015-2017
Only in Opposition 
JUNTSxCAT Junts per Catalunya ESP 1 2017-2019
Only in Opposition 










ESP 7 1987-1990 and 2005-2009 (Galicia) Only in Opposition 
EM
En Marea 
= ANOVA + 
Podemos + EU 
(Galicia) 
ESP 1 Only in Opposition Only in Opposition 
UM Unió Mallorquina ESP 3+1
1987-1995 and 2007-
2009
Only in Opposition 
BLOC Bloc per Mallorca ESP 1 2007-2011
Only in Opposition 
PR Partido Riojano ESP 3
1991-1995 (La Rioja)
Only in Opposition 
UPN Unión del Pueblo Navarro ESP 6 1991-2015 (Navarra) Only in Opposition 
HB Herri Batasuna ESP 2 (Navarra) + 2 (Pais Vasco) Only in Opposition Only in Opposition 
EH Euskal Herritarrok ESP
1 (Navarra) + 
1 (Pais Vasco) 2015-2019 (Navarra) Only in Opposition 
NABAI Nafarroa Bai ESP 2 (Navarra) Only in Opposition Only in Opposition 
EH BI Euskal Herria Bildu ESP
1 (Navarra) + 
2 (Pais Vasco) 2015-2019 (Navarra) Only in Opposition 
GBAI Geroa Bai ESP 1 (Navarra) 2015-2019 (Navarra) Only in Opposition 
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2019 (Basque) and 
1999-2003 (Navarre)
Only in Opposition 
EE Euskadiko Ezkerra ESP 2 (Pais Vasco)
1979-1980 and 1991 
(Basque) Only in Opposition 
EA Eusko Alkartasuna ESP 3 (Pais Vasco)
1991 and 1995-2009 
(Basque) and 1999-
2003 (Navarre)
Only in Opposition 
SNP Scottish National Party UK 5 2007-2019 Only in Opposition 
PC Plaid Cymru UK 5 2007-2011 Only in Opposition 
SA Stella Alpina ITA 2 2006-2019 Only in Opposition 
UV Unión Valdôtaine ITA 2
1949-1966 and 1974-
1990 and 1992-2019





















1979 and 1983-1988 
and 2014-2019
Only in Opposition 
DF Die Freiheitlichen ITA 5 Only in Opposition Only in Opposition 
UFS Union für Südtirol ITA 3 Only in Opposition Only in Opposition 
STF Süd-Tiroler Freiheit ITA 2 Only in Opposition Only in Opposition 
SVP Südtiroler Volkspartei ITA 9
1948-1959 and 1970-









Only in Opposition 
LN TR Lega Nord Trentino ITA 2 2018-2019
1994 and 2001-2006 
and 2008-2011 and 
2018-2019
LN LV Lega Nord - Liga Veneta ITA 2 1993-1995 and 2000-2019
1995 and 2001-2006 




2020 | Vol. 12 | No. 3 
98
Appendix C: Regrouping codes from MARPOR/RMP coding scheme
Party - ideology : Three main dimension of party competition
Socio - Economic Territorial Liberalism-Authoritarianism














incentives 402   democracy 202





negative 407   
anti-growth 






economic growth : 








orthodoxy 414   







limitation 505   




nationalization 413 education limitation 507   
traditional morality 
: negative 604  
marxist analysis : 
positive 415
labour groups : 
negative 702   
multiculturalism : 
positive 607  
equality : positive 












expansion 506      
labour groups : 
positive 701      
Right-Left position („RILE“)     
left emphasis right emphasis     
anti-imperialism 
103
military : positive 




human rights 201     




305     
democracy 202 free market economy 401     
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Party - ideology : Three main dimension of party competition
Socio - Economic Territorial Liberalism-Authoritarianism
















limitation 505     




: positive 603     
education 
expansion 506 law and order 605     
labour groups : 
positive 701
civic mindedness : 
positive 606     
Appendix D: Descriptive (RMP) Statistics: Governing versus Oppositional regionalist parties (with N=129)
(Independent) Variable Governing Oppositional
Territorial salience (%) 4,40% 4,06%
Socio-economic salience (%) 39,27% 33,47%
Liberalism-Authoritarianism salience (%) 27,72% 25,59%
Territorial position (- or +) (+)4,37 (+)4,06
Right-Left position (- or +) -9,98 0,23
Liberalism-Authoritarianism position (- or +) (+)0,28 -7,85
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Appendix E: RMP binary logistic regression (salience and position).
Binary Logistic Regression: regional government participation (salience). With N=96.
 (Independent) Variable B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B)
Block 1
Territorial salience (%) -0,13 0,14 0,88 1,00 0,35 0,88
Liberalism-Authoritarianism salience (%) 0,09 0,06 1,97 1,00 0,16 1,09
Socio-Economic salience (%) 0,03 0,06 0,30 1,00 0,59 1,03
Block 2
Electoral score - regional (% votes) 0,05 0,03 2,59 1,00 0,11 1,05
Regional Authority Index score 0,13 0,06 5,23 1,00 0,02 1,14
Economic Growth (% GDP) -0,16 0,20 0,68 1,00 0,41 0,85
Party age (years since foundation) 0,02 0,02 1,78 1,00 0,18 1,02
Electoral score - national (% votes) 0,14 0,30 0,21 1,00 0,65 1,15
Constant -7,37 4,09 3,24 1,00 0,07 0,00
Binary Logistic Regression: regional government participation (position).With N=96.
 (Independent) Variable B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B)
Block 1
Territorial position (- or +) -0,061 0,08 0,653 1 0,419 0,94
Lib-Auth Position (- or +) -0,072 0,04 3,356 1 0,067 0,931
Block 2
Electoral score - regional (% votes) 0,065 0,03 5,2 1 0,023 1,067
Regional Authority Index score 0,177 0,07 7,398 1 0,007 1,193
Economic Growth (% GDP) -0,284 0,19 2,187 1 0,139 0,753
Party age (years since foundation) 0,03 0,02 2,079 1 0,149 1,031
Constant -5,162 2,4 4,627 1 0,031 0,006
